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7. Thomas More and the

Humanist Tradition:
Martyrdom and Ambiguity
Charles Trinkaus

This paper, completed June 4, 1978, was originally presented to a
symposium commemorating the SOOth anniversary of the birth of
Thomas More, and honoring the late Richard S. Sylvester, held in
Washington, D. c., June 22,1978. Since the paper's two main themes seek
to affiliate Thomas More to the Renaissance humanist tradition by
stressing the presence of a secular marytrology among the humanists and
by emphasizing their awareness of ambiguity and complementarity in
their conceptions of cultural and moral values, it seemed entirely
appropriate to dedicate this paper to the memory of Benjamin Nelson, a
man to whom lowe very much in the development of my own vision of
history, culture, and morality. For Benjamin Nelson, though most
certainly not playing the martyr, understood, better than most of our
generation, the power and claims of past martyrdoms on the psychic life
of all men. And he was deeply sensitive to the problemrttic character of
the great themes of conscience and the cure of souls he illuminated so
well in his studies of mankind's history.
This essay is an effort to pay tribute to a man of penetrating intellect,
tireless devotion to his fellows, unyielding protection of his faith, and
matchless sensitivity to the meaning of word and act. The collective
tokens of contemporary admiration for More are manifold. Hardly one of
us sees in him exactly what another has, but in all modern students of
More there is a unanimity of respect and warmth of regard that responds
to the relics of his life and mind as they reach to us across the centuries.
We are a generation who in many senses has found in Thomas More the
qualities we have missed in ourselves. We have made him embody our
own ideals by the ways in which we have sought to interpret him, varied
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and clashing, yet ultimately agreeing. There was clearly something
exceptional and large in him that could evoke such a unity out of
plurality, such a coincidence of opposites.
It was my hope in trying to familiarize myself with some of the details of
the magnificent Yale edition of the complete works of Thomas More that I
might find something approaching an interpretive consensus developing, a
consensus that clearly did not exist thirty years ago. But I have come
gradually to conclude that however many the symposia, however many
times scholars gather to exchange their thoughts and views of More, this
will never be. Yet my humility before the scholarly and interpretive
achievement of this past generation, both of the makers of the Yale
edition and of the many others who have continued to be fascinated,
study, and write, is vast, almost rivalling my humility before Thomas
More himself. For this reason this paper will, for the most part, leave the
discussion of More to others and retreat to a few observations on the
humanist tradition from which he came, emphasizing two aspects of this
tradition that can be identified in Thomas More. Somewhat arbitrarily,
therefore, and yet with a strong conviction of their validity, I am going to
offer two broader approaches than the usual academic conception of the
humanistic tradition that seem relevant to this man: the presence of
elements of martyrdom and of ambiguity in the tradition.

Martyrdom
Humanism, which is after all a term of our own modern invention,
includes not only its meaning of admiration for and education in the
ancient classics as first defined but comprehends the entire sweep of
learning in the studia humanitatis of the Renaissance. 1 But far more than
being a series of studies it was also a movement that, starting out from a
scholarly and intellectual base, had a profound impact on the thought and
action of that entire age. 2 Moreover, these Renaissance humanists who
sought to influence their fellows of other professions and their secular
and ecclesiastical rulers, also cheered themselves on and enlivened their
onlookers and prospective listeners by reciting the lives and merits of the
ancients. Petrarch with his De viris illustribus was only the first. The
humanist tradition in a very literal (and literary) sense then was the
rekindled memory of the great figures of the past who had sought
somehow to bring their wisdom and learning to bear on the affairs of
men. We shall, therefore, as a first broadening of our conception of a
humanist tradition, review some of these ancient and early Christian
figures with whom Renaissance humanists identified.
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Ancient tradition itself was repeated by Cicero in his Tusculans, that
"Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy from the heavens,
placed it in the cities, introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine
into life and morals, and good and evil."3 In thinking of their own kind of
learning as important in the lives of men, the Renaissance humanists
always returned to this statement of Cicero's and others like it. Socrates,
the martyr to the cause of the "examined life," is unquestionably evoked
when we think of More, the martyr for his faith. But the connection of
Socrates with More and humanism is deeper still. The "philosophy" that
Cicero is talking about was that moral philosophy conceded with its
qualities as the last of the studia humanitatis, and the term "philosophy"
was used by Petrarch also to describe his own role of moral and cultural
guidance. We are in fact engaged in a quarrel reaching over the centuries
for the right to use that word, philosophy, and my remarks above show that
it is still going on. But the quarre lover philosophy and rhetoric and the use of
the words in a historically valid sense does indeed begin with Plato and
his dispute with those who professed to teach wisdom, the sophistai. And
it is at the end of his Phaedrus 4 in which Plato embraces so much of the
rhetorical art that he has Socrates express his admiration for the young
"rhetor," Isocrates, as the possible future "lover of wisdom" or
"philosopher" who will combine the study of wisdom with the art and gift
of speech. Similarly it was the mature Isocrates, the gifted and influential
educator and advocate of Panhellenism, who spoke always of l\is
philosophical rivals, Plato and Aristotle, as" sophists" and of himself and
his friends as "philosophers." And again in the Renaissance the scholastics
are charged with windy sophistry (ventosa sophistica), beginning with
Petrarch, and including emphatic charges by Erasmus and our Thomas.
It was, then, a growing view among Renaissance humanists (Petrarch
had not fully shared it, but Salutati certainly had) that the humanist
tradition rightly began with Socrates, and who is to say they were wrong.
But we, of course, know Socrates by no writings but only by Plato's and
Xenophon's accounts, and other echoes which differ sufficiently for us
to claim that we know him only by hearsay. Taking our hearsay from
Plato, however, we might ask what sort of man Socrates was and whether
he could be seen as a paradigm for Thomas More. The legend is good for
our case if we accept, as Aristotle does,5 that he was the true author of
those ideas Plato presents as Socrates's in the Republic. And though we
can agree with J. H. Hexter 6 that More's use of the Republic in Utopia was
idiosyncratic and that his position was different from Plato's, I think we
must also agree that the central question in both works was whether there
can be any justice in our private dealings unless there is first justice in the
structure of society as a whole. And if we come now to Plato's own views
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of justice there is the most fundamental disagreement between Plato and
More: justice clearly meaning equality for More, (whether disguised as
himself or as "Hythloday"), whereas Plato's definition for it was
proportion. Moreover, another problem that deeply concerned More
throughout his entire life was critical for Plato/Socrates as well: a concern
basic to our notion of humanism, that of the role of the morally wise man
in the affairs of the public and as a ruler of the state.
The story begins for Plato/Socrates, not in earlier but in different
dialogues, namely the Protagoras and the Theatetus, where the sophist
vision of man and moral behavior as represented by Protagoras is directly
confronted by Socrates. We in our historical sophistication are inclined to
follow Werner Jaeger 7 and Kristeller 8 and see in Protagoras (along with
Gorgias and his pupil, Isocrates) the founders of a rival rhetorical
tradition to Plato's and Socrates' philosophical one. But we can also see
that, as viewed by another age, perhaps the two do not differ that much,
and certainly in Renaissance humanist eyes they were differing not in
their major purpose, which was to bring learning to bear on public affairs,
but about the proper educational means. While Protagoras denies that
any man can know other than what he senses and experiences, he also
believes that man possesses an innate sense of justice and piety and can
be taught to respect what his own society defines as justice. And here is
the whole premise of the humanist tradition throughout its history-that
most men can be taught to be virtuous, both the peasant and the kingwhereas the Platonic/Socratic view is that God, not man, is the measure
of all things and that only the philosopher who has achieved an insight
into the divine form or structure of things can guide mankind toward
justice, best of all when the philosopher himself is the king. And this is a
higher (because cosmic) justice than that pragmatic human kind which is
wrought in the law courts, taught in the classroom, or preached in the
assembly. In this confrontation there are poignant problems for the
Renaissance figures we know, be they humanists or other. But before we
seek to untangle them we had better take a look at two other paradigms of
humanism, better known to most in the Renaissance, Cicero and Seneca.
Let us remember that three of these figures-Socrates, Cicero, and
Seneca-paid with their lives when the morality they so famously
represented proved an obstacle to the ambition of rulers, and that the
fourth, Plato, was deceived and misused by Dionysius, the tyrant of
Syracuse. There was something in the Renaissance view (sharply
expressed by More's "Hythloday") that a humanist would fare badly in
the halls of power (however much he ought to be there). It is difficult to
think of Cicero as a martyr because he has seemed in his private letters so
manifestly crass and self-serving about his public career even though he
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wanted it never to be forgotten that he had "saved the state." He brought
through his writings more of Greek rhetorical wisdom to the Latin West
than anyone but Quintilian, and certainly more of Greek philosophy than
anyone excepting only Boethius and Scotus Eriugena until the medieval
translations from Greek and Arabic and the Renaissance translations of
the Greek. But as one of the world's most renowned lawyers and orators,
and however ambivalent and vacillating he was in his devotion to political
action on behalf of public freedom and welfare, his contribution to the
moral and political thought of the Renaissance was ubiquitous. Justice for
Cicero came down to the fulfillment of a man's rationally projected roles
in the great society-as a participant in common humanity, as a member
of a nation, as a citizen of a city, and as an individual in a family. Although
Petrarch was able to misread Cicero as writing on behalf of retirement
from public affairs (as in his last days it was forced upon him),
Renaissance humanists more generally favored his forthright endorsement of action and civic participation: "No man has any right to permit his
intellectual exercises to interfere with his performance of the duties of an
active life, for it is by its activity that virtue earns the highest praise. And
yet respites come frequently and bring with them abundant opportunities
for a return to study; moreover, the mind, which never rests, is quite
capable of keeping us, all unwitting, at the task of seeking knowledge."9
Cicero was an ancient humanist. With that no one has quarreled. But to
be so conceived, by both himself and by the humanists of the Renaissance,
his mastery of rhetoric (theoretical and practical) needed to be linked in
some way to philosophy. His allegiance to the practical realm over the
theoretical was plain enough. But did he profess philosophy only as a
prestigious adjunct to an effective rhetorical career, as some of his
statements suggest, or did he have a more genuine commitment? Jerrold
Seigel has stressed the importance of Cicero's philosophical side, but
seems to leave it, indeed, adjunctive, not genuinely integrated. 10 Cicero
does declare allegiance to the Academic school and sometimes takes over
the Stoic point of view as his own. He draws loosely and certainly
eclectically on a variety of sources. I believe his authentic position can be
reconstructed, something as follows: Religiously, he has no doubt
concerning the existence of phenomena that were beyond human
understanding, and he offered the traditional Roman ways of worshipping
and relating to religious reality his utmost reverence and care. He saw this
as something apart from philosophy, which he comprehended almost
entirely as the pursuit of wisdom in the conduct of human affairs. Natural
philosophy seemed useful but secondary to the study of ethics. A serious
man should be more careful not to commit himself to anyone point of
view as the various schools and philosophers seemed to contradict
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themselves and also to overlap and repeat too much. Hence Academicism in
the end had the greatest appeal for him with its declaration that any
formulation of truth could be matched by a contrary one, so that
verisimilitude-probability- was the most for which one could hope. As a
lawyer and an orator Cicero and others of similar profession would
necessarily deal with a constantly fluctuating situation and a human
constituency of the greatest variety. There the rhetorical commonplace,
reaching a mixed audience, would indeed provide a basis for the only
possible kind of loose unity of which the collective life of man was
capable. But talent, practice of the art, experience, expanding knowledge
leading to wisdom-all were essential. I believe that an image of Cicero as
an orator and a philosopher such as this comes close to the way in which
many Renaissance humanists read and judged him, and that this throws
light on their own conceptions of their role in relation to philosophy. I
believe also that behind Cicero's outlook was the serious grappling with
the problem of collective wisdom and virtue by the Greek sophists,
particularly Protagoras whom Plato respected sufficiently to confront in
two different dialogues. Cicero also learned from the writings of Isocrates
and from the rhetorical and moral works of Aristotle, but it is of especial
interest that he actually translated Plato's Protagoras, a version that has
been lost. I do not know if he ever quoted the Theatetus, but the point of
view in the "Apology of Protagoras" II composed by Plato in this dialogue
seems appropriate also to Cicero.
Until the fifteenth century Seneca was thought by some humanists to
be a Nicodemite, or concealed Christian. And even as late as 1532 Lefevre
d'Etaples was still publishing a commentary on the forged correspondence
between Seneca and St. Paul. 12 What Renaissance humanists saw in
Seneca, some accepting and some doubting his Christianity, was the
great moral counselor and guide to inwardness and tranquility in the face
of life's disturbances and distractions. But Seneca also was a man of public
affairs and a counselor of emperors. To many modern commentators his
attitude has seemed ambiguous and problematic. In the end he committed
suicide at Nero's order. Justice for this Stoic lay in the universal rational
order of fate, heimarmene, and could be found only by resignation and
acceptance. Yet he could counsel humanity and responsibility and offer
highly practical psychological advice.
Seneca was important, especially in the early Renaissance, as the
paradigm of the lay moral counselor. Petrarch modelled his figure of Ratio
in the De remediis on the authentic Senecan Epistulae ad Lucilliunr as well as
on the probably pseudo-Senecan De remediis fortuitarum. Seneca's
influence on More seems to the outsider to be fairly limited. For instance,
there are relatively few citations or allusions to him in A Dialogue of
Comfort. 13 We shall see a reason for Seneca's diminishment presently.
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We come to the interesting question of the extent to which the Church
Fathers were regarded as predecessors by Renaissance humanists, and
this involves the latters' attitudes toward the non-Christianity of their
pagan models of wisdom-not a question to be hastily answered in a
short paper. An answer can be approached only by examining the
individual complexity found in the cases of each Renaissance writer, and I
offer simply this observation: most Renaissance humanists were neither
members of religious orders nor churchmen, or if they were, some, like
Petrarch and Erasmus, did their best to live as laymen. 14 It was, perhaps,
easier for them as laymen to identify with the non-Christian ancient
humanist than with the venerable patristic figures who were in many
instances saints. Yet Jerome and Augustine both attracted the interest of
humanists powerfully and, to my reading, influenced a wide range of
Renaissance humanists more deeply and persistently than the pagans.
But again the differences of individuals is crucial. In the case of Augustine
the Italian humanists played a major role in his late medieval and
Renaissance rehabilitation prior to the Reformation. Because of Luther's
and Calvin's overt Augustinianism a sectarian problem developed in the
sixteenth century. But there were also influential Augustinians at least
among the early Catholic Reformers.
For many of the humanists Augustine was the father who admired
Plato and, even more significantly, one who became a philosopher on
reading Cicero's Hortensius. I would not want to argue that the Ciceronian
elements were stronger than the Platonic in the formation of Augustine's
theology (he refutes and praises them both as the best of the pagans). In
the De doctrina Christiana we have a more influential handbook on the use
of lay learning, particularly the language arts and rhetoric, in the service
of religion. Other fathers with whom Italian humanists closely identified
were Lactantius and Jerome of course, and Eusebius, Basil, and Chrysostom
among the Greeks. It should not be overlooked in late antiquity, both in
the Latin and Greek worlds, how many men of rhetorical training, orators
or sophistai, were converted and became Christian writers. Renaissance
humanists gladly reported their examples and statements in support of
classical studies and a more rhetorical theology. Since not all humanists
were concerned with theology it was easier to admire the pastoral
writings of the fathers and their pulpit oratory. Only as an interest in
theology developed with Lorenzo Valla and the Florentine Platonists,
and after them with Erasmus and other so-called Christian humanists of
the North, did such philosophical theologians as Origen come to the fore.
On the other hand, proponents of the powerful Renaissance theme of the
dignity of man early found the theological base for their assertions in
Augustine's emphasis on a human mental trinity mirroring the divine
Trinity.
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More's attachment to St. Augustine is well known, but as Father Surtz
declared in his introductory section to the Yale translation of Utopia, the
exact connection of Utopia with the De civitate Dei remains to be worked
out. 15 Humanists such as Valla and Erasmus did not hesitate to polemicize
with many of Augustine's positions. But it should never be forgotten
that what were perhaps the pivotal issues of both the Renaissance and the
Reformation had found their monumental exposition in the De civitate
Dei, namely whether the world of man could be truly Christian and how
much could mankind save itself from its own impulses to self-destruction
apart from grace? Moreover book 19 of the De civitate Dei set the terms for
the discussion of the great Erasmian-Morean problem of finding peace in
a world where there was no peace. There were some who would have
argued, not long ago, that to see the Church fathers as central to the
thinking of the Renaissance was a contradiction in terms. But I cannot
think that it is so anymore. Rather the Church fathers provided the frame
within which Renaissance humanists in great preponderance viewed the
antique past, explored the great pagan works in a new objectivity and
depth, and were able to criticize them for their inappropriateness while
admiring their historical actuality.
It would seem then that in speaking of the humanist tradition in the
Renaissance we should recognize, as the Renaissance humanists did, that
they had had their historical predecessors-seminal writers and thinkers
of the classical and early Christian past whose intellectual and literary
influence on all subsequent ages has been strong, but who had something
special to offer the Renaissance. For the latter they offered examples of
the possible social and cultural role of the man of learning, and powerful
thinking concerning human nature and a just society. Some of them, at
least, presented a model of a certain life-style: that of the intellectual who
believed he could and should provide counsel and guidance to the
mighty of this world, whether the emperor or the demos, only to arouse
their ire in an especially vindictive way that could lead to execution,
proscription, or commanded suicide. I would not want to suggest that
here was the origin of the modern alienated intellectual any more than
that Thomas More sought his own martyrdom. But the inner conviction
of personal rightness ran strong in Socrates, at least as Plato represents
him, as it also did in Cicero and Seneca. At the same time we have some
evidence on which to question the absolute purity of motives of all of
them. They were in certain respects antiheroes as well as heroes. But I
would claim that for most of the individuals comprising the Renaissance
phase of the humanist tradition, (though not many had the clean courage
to risk and accept martyrdom), there was a sense of exclusion from the
seats of power which they simultaneously coveted and despised. In Italy
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this was true even for those humanists who came from the leading
families or the nobility. The motives of idealism-religious, moral,
social-and those of self-advancement were never far apart nor totally
distinguishable. When I think of the intelligence and integrity and
confidence of More, I think of Coluccio Salutati and Lorenzo Valla and
even Machiavelli more than of other Italians.

Ambiguity
I shall not try now to justify such an allegation of similarity of life-style
between Renaissance and ancient humanists but wish to look at that other
broad feature of the humanist tradition I proposed at the beginning of this
essay. Thinking primarily of Italian humanist culture and its eventual
influences upon a developing northern humanist culture, several interconnected anthropological themes may be identified. Although I will
make general statements concerning these themes, it should be understood that I would not wish it to be thought that all humanists engaged in
speculation and argumentation concening these issues or that they
always agreed. Indeed, they were frequently presented in dialogue as
multi-sided controversy and debated between individuals. As themes
they exhibit complementary positions rather than polarity, and are
ordinarily seen as reflecting that exasperating humanist sense of ambiguity that still sets the teeth of scholarly dialecticians on edge.
The first such theme is the question of faith and knowledge, and of the
right road toward acquisition of either: linguistic and historical studies or
dialectic? From the perspective of purely intellectual history, here is the
central issue between humanism and scholasticism, weli elaborated in
More's crucial letter to Dorp.16 It is infrequently noticed that there was a
certain agreement between most humanist critics of nominalism and
their supposed enemies. Both rejected metaphysical realism. Both
assumed the necessity of faith. Could one then speak about God and
divine things? Both agreed that one could, provided such speech was
seen to have a suppositious, "as if" status. What then was the issue? For
the nominales of the via moderna, theology became the substitution of
dialectical analysis of the terms used to speak about God in order to
determine whether a logically consistent statement had been made for
metaphysical speculation on the statement's correspondence to divine
reality. The scriptures were to be accepted as the Word of God, but they
were subject to the one grand nominalist assumption that God's power,
barring violation of the law of contradiction, was absolute and He could
do anything. What God actually did do, therefore, was not naturally
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necessary but contingent upon His will. What God had wrought and
made known through scripture and nature had the authority of divine
ordinance and the security of a divine covenant. It was theology's
function to support what was divinely established within the world, not
to determine its ultimate character by analogy to the science of nature.
For the humanist man could speak about God metaphorically, only as
he imagined Him, and of invisible things only through the visible things
of this world. But in this he had a model in Biblical poetics. Theology was
necessarily poetic and concealed a higher truth behind its figures of
speech, as did the scriptures. Such was the viewpoint of Petrarch,
Boccaccio, and Salutati. To this was added the philological analysis of
scripture by Valla and ManettL followed later by Erasmus, based on the
collation of Vulgate translation with Greek and Hebrew original. From it
came a more literal acceptance of the bare scriptural meaning which
sometimes had to be seen as concealing a mystery. Faith was a matter of
trust and obedience and even more imaginative inspiration, and the
resources of language were to be deployed by mankind for its mutual
persuasion in joyous acceptance of divine mercy and truth. 171t does seem
clear, at least to this scholar, that an important element of reform was
central to humanist religious reflection in its desire to circumvent the
aridity and artificiality of a formalistic fidelity to church and sacraments,
and to reinforce a necessary inwardness. Hence humanists led the way
toward a reformation of letter into spirit which Protestants carried much
farther, sometimes reverting to literalism, repudiating the authority of
the historical church and changing the conception of sacrament. But it
also seems clear that for earlier Italian humanism through to More and
Erasmus, the aim was to restore authentic belief to Christian obedience
and spiritual depth to the sacramental life, for both were part of the
historical continuum and interpretive dialogue by which mankind
collectively lived. Other and later humanists saw things in Protestant
ways as well as also remaining Catholics. Ultimately, of course, it was the
humanist way of dialogue and persuasion that failed in the violence of
religious persecution and conflict.
The second complementary theme, which was also inherited from the
scholastic past, was that of the relationship of intellect and will, reason
and affect. Petrarch said, "It is better (satius) to love the good than to know
the truth."18 Will was inflamed and aroused by words. In his De remediis,
on the other hand, Ratio is his spokesman. But Ratio did not speak in the
syllogisms which he had ridiculed in his Contra medicum. It offered to
Gaudium and Dolor pithy quotations, anecdotes from the classics, exhortations, all the arsenal of the rhetor's art. Ratio is really Oratio or Speech,
and each chapter is the occasion for a humanistic sermon. It is, as the
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Secretum and the De otio religioso reveal, man's affects that he is addressing,
but in order to transform, not suppress them.
Behind will is power, as Salutati clearly saw. Theologically the debate
over the primacy of the intellect or will, when it moved with Duns Scotus
emphatically to the side of the will, reinforced the conception of God as a
subjective power, as pure and absolute subjectivity, as He was perceived
through the fourteenth century and on up through the Reformation. But
correspondingly, human will meant human power; it was the faculty by
which man asserted himself, either in obedience or living conformity to
God or in defiance. What we see as the statist power dynamics of the age
was already spelled out in the theology and political philosophy of the
closing medieval centuries.
But could rhetoric, the humanist's reason, temper the fury of the
affects? Salutati saw will as commanding and distorting the intellect. Valla
saw man as all affect with virtue as caritas and fortitudo, vice as hate and
cowardice. Prudence or malignity, faith or distrust, were merely intellectual instruments of the passions. Behind this debate, or rather sometimes
fronting for it, was the question of grace and free will. It should be noted
that the action and its moral character belonged to man, whether
springing from free will or grace, human power or divine power. Power
and love are linked in Franciscan theology and humanist psychologyfortitude and caritas, as Valla argued. Erasmus seemingly disagreed with
Valla, who actually affirmed both free will and predestination leaving the
reconciliation as a mystery beyond man. Luther seemingly agreed.
Action and contemplation, an ancient and medieval theme, acquires a
new emphasis in the Renaissance. The speculative life was closest to that
of the gods and the happiest for Aristotle. In the Middle Ages contemplation
was often identified with the monastic way to salvation, but even more
frequently contemplation was the way of the mystic. The old attitude
lived on in Petrarch's connection of contemplation, meditation, and otium
in his De otio religioso and in the Secretum and the De vita solita ria. But
meditation has become a form of psychic concentration focusing on the
last things. It draws the soul back together from its distraction by the
trivial moments of daily experience. Already in the De remediis Petrarch
praises action as a cure for melancholy, though the greater stress is upon
attitudinal change brought on by contemplation. Meditation is ego-directed,
not ego-exhausting; it is an internal dialogue, a focusing of rhetoric on
the self.
Renaissance activism begins with Salutati's De vita activa et operosa, a
work planned but never written. There is ample evidence of his views,
however, in his letters and other writings. The value of activity is strongly
affirmed by Leon Battista Alberti in the Libri della famiglia and again in De
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iciarchia. Ozio becomes the worst vice, even a sin, because God did not
create man to live in idleness, but in order to employ his faculties.
Industria is a leading virtue. For Valla, too, God was not quiescent but
active and creative. So should be man, whose soul is not a tabula rasa
painted by his sensations of the exterior world but a flame that casts its
light and heat upon the world and uses it. In the emergent genre of "the
dignity and excellence of man" Giannozo Manetti affirms that man's
creation in the divine image and likeness is actualized by asserting his
godlike qualities-beauty, intelligence, inventiveness, power, and
opulence. Man's function is to understand and act-intelligere et agere. The
Renaissance Platonists, Ficino and Pico, take this humanist vision of
human activism and rebuild it into a Neoplatonic metaphysics, with
especially Ficino stressing man's natural emulation of God. How much
this emphasis is stressed in More is matter for discussion. It is certainly
strongly projected in Utopia and is present in A Dialogue of Comfort, while,
on the other hand, the question of a special Renaissance mode of
meditation surely rises in the Tower works.
A fourth theme develops out of the others. It starts as the polarity of
virtue and fortune but grows into a major new insight of the Renaissance.
It might be called the "contextuality of character." Human free will is not
only bathed in an aura of divine grace in the matter of justification but is
both enfranchized and restricted by the social environment itself. The
ideas of Machiavelli and More, likely the two greatest social thinkers to
appear in the Renaissance, emerge from the earlier humanist discussions
of this question and represent a break with the humanist tradition, if they
do in fact break, because they aspire to go beyond.
The development begins, again, with that strangly neglected masterwork of Petrarch, On the Remedies for Both Kinds of Fortune, neglected since
1752 by us, that is, though widely copied, translated, printed, and read for
the previous four centuries. There has been no printed edition in any
language since then; moreover modern scholarly discussion, with a few
recent exceptions, has been fragmentary. Petrarch's Fortuna turns out to
be not simply a depiction of the unpredictable spinning of the wheel of
chance but a panoramic overview of late medieval society and its typical
life histories differentiated according to geographic, social, and cultural
status. The countervailing virtues, as Heitmann 19 has shown, are intended as
more effective prudential strategies for individual coping with the
general exigencies of earthly life than the depressed shuddering and
elated shouting that character-shaping circumstances too often evoke. If
Petrarch was a Pelagian, it was in this realm of moral behavior; grace, he
also thought, was essential for salvation. But the achievement of a degree
of moral autonomy was an inescapable precondition for the trusting
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acceptance of the creation which might allow an infusion of grace. The
parallel question, which Hexter 20 has raised concerning the Utopians, was
whether More saw them as more grace-worthy than Christian Europeans
of his day. Hexter said "Yes," and I am inclined to agree, but must leave it
to the Moreans.
Lorenzo Valla, suspicious not only of the Pelagians of his day,
especially the nominales, but also of the humanists too enamored of
Stoicism (including Petrarch), would have demurred. As in the Utopia
later, Valla's De voluptate or De vera falsoque bono declares itself an irony
and discusses through the personae of some contemporary humanists
what a "natural," i.e., pre-Christian morality would be like. Valla's
Epicurean, who has no knowledge of Christ, is presented in terms of
individual psychology and morality. He is not embedded in a carefully
devised economic and social structure as in the case of More, nor in a
political structure, as in Machiavelli's case. Epicurean man lives as his
everyday experience dictates his needs and not according to abstract
moral formulas as did Stoic man. Virtue, or the qualification and
specification of motivation and behavior, grows out of experience and the
social environment. But virtue is affect, and a form of object-oriented
love. Pre-Christian man's love is self-directed or family-directed and
pleasure-determined as in the case of animals. Natural man is not
different from the animals except for variations in intellectual and
emotional powers. Only with Christ does mankind transcend the animal
kingdom with man's gift of immortality of souL Christian man has
transferred his love to Christ and seeks his pleasure in beatification. In
fact, "pleasure," "charity," "love," and "beatification" are no more than
contextually differentiated words meaning the same thing. Just as affect is
human emotional power, language is man's intellectual power, and is
qualified and differentiated in the active give-and-take of existence.
Giovanni Gioviano Pontano carries the analysis farther stilL A major
portion of his writings was devoted to a detailed analysis of the socially
contextual character of the virtues. He saw these in terms of linguistic
usage which he derived from observing self-motivation and the behavior
of others. In his De sermone,21 or On Speech, he develops a logos doctrine
for everyday social intercourse, just as Erasmus, following Valla, insisted
that Greek New Testament logos should be translated as sermo not
verbum-Christ in His entire life and His sayings of the gospels as the
"speech" of GodY What Valla and Erasmus sought to make sacred was
left secular by Pontano, though he was not at all unaware of its religious
implications. Declaring that De sermone was a stud y of the rhetoric of daily
human relations, comparable to the more formal and traditional rhetoric
of the law court and assembly, Pontano analyzes such positive qualities as
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comitas, facetitas, humanitas-affability or courtesy, merriment or wittiness,
gentility or kindness-as character types that he designated by adjectival
nouns: comis, facetus, humanus. Such men are essential to the well-being of
society and make earthly life pleasant, joyful, and bearable. Notable is his
use of "humanity" not merely as higher culture but closer to ou r use of it
in a philanthropic sense, contrary to Aulus Gellius's declaration. Equally
essential to holding society together in mutual concord and trust are
veracity and the truthful man. On the other side are the social vices and
evil character types, brilliantly and savagely depicted by Pontano.
Pontano combined his studies of classical literary and moral works with
his experience as counselor and chancellor in the Neapolitan court and
diplomatic service, and there is an important parallelism of career
between Pontano and More as well as a carry-over of insight.
Pontano is regarded as an important immediate predecessor to
Machiavelli in his social and historical realism. Other humanists such as
Alberti, Poggio, and Valla have also been signaled in a more fragmentary
sense for this "honor." I will not enter into the hazardous debate as to
whether Machiavelli was a humanist (though I would argue he was one).
Also, Hexter has made the classical comparison of Machiavelli and
MoreY But I do have a single point to make, which I share with Hexter.
Machiavelli's realism (so-called) was not only a realism of external
observation but a realism of rhetoric and advocacy. He wanted to change
things by showing princes and statesman how to behave in order not to
be entrapped in the concatenation of circumstances that was called
"fortune" but was in actuality what we would call the political structure
and history. But here I would recall that the most serious problem for
Machiavelli (apart from the lack of a militia or some other effective
organization for war), and one leading to political failure and/ or social
disaster, was that men's characters were formed by their experience, so
that when circumstances changed, they themselves did not change.
Machiavelli's recommendations, though admired by many, can also seem
in some ways as paltry and certainly ineffective. He advocated forceful,
determined, even impulsive action, on the basis of at least some
calculation of the structurally determined balance of forces and some
sense of ancient and modern precedents for success and failure. As More
and Erasmus knew, princes and rulers were already behaving this way
and, as we know, they still are today. To what avail?
More well knew the limits of political action and power even in
achieving its only possible goal, the retention or expansion of power. And
he knew the human consequences of this system well, even though,
whether fatuously or not we cannot say, he lent himself to it. In his Utopia
More set up the classical issues over which good men have differed since
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then, especially that of the intellectuals and the humanists participating in
power (only to then illustrate both sides of the argument in his own life).
More also, (and here I agree with Hexter), 24 saw in property the root of all
evil, or perhaps more accurately, the root of all sin, and he devised his
Utopian communism as a mental experiment outlining an alternative. He
did this in all seriousness and not simply to show how a people who had
never heard of Christ were more Christian than Christians. As again
Hexter insists, he was thinking of his own world and its problems. Nor
was he totally naive about the consequences, costs, and problems of such
a solution, imaginatively creating fully totalitarian and authoritarian
institutions for its maintenance.
If, however, More was actually proposing Utopian communism as a
programmatic solution, he would have departed from the humanist
tradition. I believe he did see the problematic character of his solution;
through his character of "Morus," he genuinely expressed rejection of it
at the end of the dialogue. He saw even more clearly and dramatically the
tragedy of the opposite failure of mankind to rise above its institutions
because he lived with them and directly observed the consequences. In
possessing this double vision, More preserved the essential dialogic
ambiguity of the humanist tradition.
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1. See Paul Oscar Kristeller's basic statement, his "Humanism and Scholasticism in the
Italian Renaissance," Byzalltion XVII (1944-45):346-74, reprinted in his Studies in
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Munz (Oxford and New York, 1965).
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12. See Letizia A. Panizza, "Gasparino Barzizza's Commentaries on Seneca's Letters,"
Traditio XXXIII (1977) :297-341 for a survey of humanist conceptions of Seneca. For Lefevre
d'Etaples, p. 339.
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and Learning," The American Benedictine Review, XXI (1970):1-55 and esp. Appendix B,
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15. CW IV, clxvi.
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certain texts by Valla, Da Lorenzo Valla a Tommaso Mora, La Statuto Umanistico della Teologia
(Pistoia, 1973), Memorie Domenicane, n. 4.
17. See the quotation from Coluccio Salutati in my hi Our Image and Likeness (London,
1970), pp. 62-63.
18. Francesco Petrarca, Prase, ed. by G. Martellotti et al. (Milan/Naples, 1955), p. 748.
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20. CW IV, lxxiv-vet seq. et passim. I take it Hexter does say, "yes," in his paragraph 1 xxvi1 xxvii.
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1954).
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